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Abstract
The sense of agency (SoA) refers to the perception that an action is the consequence of
one’s own intention. Studies exploring the SoA with neuroimaging techniques summarized
the available data and confirmed a role of fronto-parietal areas and subcortical structures.
However, these studies focused on specific regions of interest. We thus conducted a whole-
brain meta-analysis to verify which regions emerge as significant for the SoA, specifically
during motor execution. We performed a systematic search on PubMed, PsycINFO and
Cochrane databases with the following inclusion criteria: studies investigating SoA with a
visuo-motor task by means of neuroimaging in healthy subjects. We performed a quantita-
tive, whole-brain, meta-analysis of neural correlates of the SoA based on the activation likeli-
hood estimation. Of the 785 articles identified by our search, 22 studies met our inclusion
criteria (169 foci, 295 subjects for decreased agency, and 58 foci, 165 subjects for normal
agency). Neural correlates of decreased agency were the bilateral temporo-parietal junction
(MNI: 50,-54,14; -44,-52,42; -48,-56,8). Normal agency showed no significant clusters of
activation. This meta-analysis confirmed the key role of areas responsible for decreased
SoA during motor control, whereas normal agency did not show a specific neural signature.
This study sets the ground for future regions-of-interest analyses of neural correlates of
SoA, as well as potential neuromodulation studies, which might be relevant in medical condi-
tions presenting with abnormal SoA.
Introduction
The sense of agency (SoA) is an important aspect of human self-consciousness, that allows us
to distinguish between self-generated actions or thoughts and external ones [1, 2]. This cogni-
tive process is fundamental for our interaction with the external world [3], and an impairment
in the SoA has been linked with several neuropsychiatric conditions, such as schizophrenia [4,
5], alien hand syndrome [6], or functional neurological disorders [7, 8].
The SoA can be explained by the “comparator” model, a theory initially developed to
account for motor learning and control [9], and then later expanded to agency processing [10,
11]. According to this model, two neural processes contribute to the formation of agency, the
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forward (feedforward) and the inverse (feedback) processes. The first one provides the motor
commands necessary to perform an action, and makes predictions about the behavior of the
motor system [12, 13]. The second one provides the actual sensory consequence of the per-
formed action. The predictions are of key importance, because they are compared with the
actual sensory feedback from the movement. In case of perfect match, we feel that we are in
control of our actions. Conversely, in case of mismatch, a certain degree of incongruency is
perceived, and we feel that we are not the agent of the action [14]. This is typically the case for
externally generated or passive movements, which are not associated with any motor intention
and cannot be predicted by the forward process [12, 15]. The comparator model fits well with
a non-conceptual feeling of agency, where discrepancies between actual and intended move-
ments are unconsciously detected. However, it does not account for a higher order, conceptual
judgement of agency, where agency assignments to the self or the other are made [16]. Indeed,
it has been proposed that feeling and judgement of agency are two distinct neural processes,
whose interaction gives rise to the SoA [17]. More specifically, if the feeling of agency has been
defined as an unconscious ongoing flow of action processing, where actions are simply tagged
as self-caused or not [17], the judgement of agency is its conscious counterpart, where several
multidimensional factors, including expectations of action and beliefs of being the agent of the
movement, are processed [16, 18].
Studies over the last 20 years have investigated the SoA, in both healthy subjects and
patients [19]. Well-established paradigms for this consist of computer-based games, where
participants first perform a motor task, and then are asked to evaluate their sense of control
over their actions. In such games, the SoA can be artificially distorted by introducing a delay
[20–24], or by manipulating the congruency of the visual feedback [21, 25], thus triggering the
feeling that we are not in control of the executed movement and, possibly, that the movement
is performed by someone else.
Neuroimaging studies have mainly focused on the feeling of agency, and have found that
the SoA involves areas devoted to the motor system (ventral premotor cortex [26, 27], supple-
mentary motor areas–SMA [20, 26, 28–31] and pre-SMA [21, 31–37]–cerebellum [20, 26, 28,
30–32, 34, 37–41]), as well as to cognition and multimodal information processing, such as the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [3, 33, 39, 40, 42], the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) [30, 31, 36,
38, 39, 42] and the insula [20, 25, 32, 36–40]. In particular, the PPC has been identified as a key
area for agency processing, as it plays an important role in mismatch detection between
intended and actual consequences of an action [30, 33, 36, 40].
The literature on the SoA can be broadly divided into two kinds of experiments: the study
of brain activations in response to decreased sense of control, occurring when the SoA is dis-
rupted by artificially impairing the congruence between movement and visual feedback, and
in response to normal sense of control [1], when no manipulation is present. Different brain
activations have been identified in response to these processes, but no clear discrimination
between these two networks has been established yet.
Previous meta-analyses on brain activation in response to manipulation of SoA have
focused on specific areas [21, 43], or on the SoA from a general point of view [1], and not spe-
cifically during motor tasks. Indeed it has been shown that SoA mainly arises when an action
is performed [44], and this process should be thus investigated in relation to motion. This
paper aims to shed light on the brain networks of reduced and normal agency, during motor
control, and to precisely locate these networks on the cortex, under the assumption that the
two processes activate different brain regions. To this end, we systematically reviewed the liter-
ature investigating the SoA over the last 20 years, and conducted a quantitative, whole-brain,
meta-analysis, following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic review and Meta-
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Analysis protocols (PRISMA-P) guidelines [45], of the neural correlates of the SoA, with spe-
cific focus on studies manipulating the sense of control over a behavioral motor task.
Materials and methods
This study was carried out in accordance to the latest version of the Declaration of Helsinki.
As this study analyzed data already published, no informed consent was needed.
Literature search
We searched the PubMed, PsycINFO, and Cochrane databases between January 1999 and Jan-
uary 2019. We did not include earlier studies because the definition of the SoA, as well as the
quality of the neuroimaging techniques, may have been different earlier, and could not guaran-
tee the inclusion of studies with comparable results. Search terms were: "magnetic resonance
imaging" [All fields] OR Fmri [All fields] OR PET [All Fields] OR "positron emission tomogra-
phy" [All Fields] AND “agency” [All Fields] AND "humans" [MeSH Terms]. Moreover, we
used the “related articles” function of the PubMed database to identify additional papers. We
also manually searched reference lists of articles identified by our search. The inclusion criteria
were: 1. trials involving healthy adult (18 years old or older) human subjects, studies engaging
their participants in a behavioral motor task where the visual feedback was artificially manipu-
lated in the way that it was not always coherent with the motor intention, 2. studies using neu-
roimaging techniques, 3. studies published in peer-reviewed journals, 4. studies in English.
Exclusion criteria were: 1. studies in which the brain areas where not clearly identified by stan-
dard Talairach (TAL) or Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates, 2. studies where
no significant clusters of activation were found.
We screened the titles and abstracts yielded by the search against the inclusion criteria and
obtained full reports for all papers that appeared to meet the inclusion criteria. The papers
were then examined in more details to see whether they actually met the inclusion criteria.
None of the authors was blind to the journal titles or to the study authors or institutions.
Risk of bias assessment and quality of evidence
The selected papers were reviewed for risk of bias using the Cochrane Risk of Bias tool (RoB
2.0) [46], and categorized as “low risk”, “some concerns” or “high risk” based on the following
items of the RoB: randomization, deviation from intervention, missing data, and measurement
of the outcome. We excluded the “risk due to selection of the reported results” from the analy-
sis, as the investigated studies reported only one main outcome, i.e., the brain activation pat-
terns in response to manipulation of agency.
Meta-analysis
The main outcomes we extracted were the MNI or TAL coordinates of the activation peaks in
response to experience of agency, as well as basic demographic data of the investigated sam-
ples. We defined negative agency as the experience of reduced motor control, and positive
agency as its exact opposite, i.e., the experience of normal control. We performed two separate
analyses, for negative and positive agency, respectively. Negative agency was identified by the
contrasts negative VS positive agency, whereas positive agency was identified by the contrasts
positive VS negative agency.
The analysis of the activation peaks was performed using activation likelihood estimation
(ALE) [47, 48], implemented in GingerALE 3.0.2. The foci (coordinates of the maximum acti-
vation) identified from each study were first converted into standard MNI space, if needed,
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and then modelled as the peaks of a 3D Gaussian probability distribution. ALE scores were cal-
culated on a voxel-by-voxel basis, by taking the union of the individual “modelled activation”
maps, i.e., the maps of active brain areas resulting from each single study. Statistical signifi-
cance was assessed with a voxel-level threshold of p< 0.001, and a cluster-forming threshold
of p< 0.05 corrected with Family-Wise Error (FWE), and 5000 permutation tests to correct
for multiple comparisons [49]. Each ALE map was finally overlaid onto an anatomical tem-
plate obtained by normalizing the International Consortium for Brain Mapping (ICBM) tem-
plate to the MNI space.
Results
Literature search
The literature search yielded a total of 684 studies from the PubMed database, 53 from Psy-
cInfo, and 48 from the Cochrane Library. We then filtered out the studies not measuring the
SoA, as well as duplicates across databases. Out of the 59 remaining studies, we further
excluded 22 studies with patients (e.g., alien hand syndrome, functional neurological disor-
ders, major depression, schizophrenia), and 15 studies where the sense of agency was not
tested with a motor paradigm and an artificial manipulation of the visual feedback. The final
selection was 22 studies (23 experiments), of which 19 were performed with fMRI techniques
and 3 with PET (Fig 1, Table 1). The distribution of the experiments over the years is shown in
Fig 2.
Risk of bias assessment
The investigation of the RoB revealed that two studies raised some concerns with regards to
randomization bias (no information on randomization of the task repetitions) [34, 42], all
studies were considered at low risk with regards to deviations from intended protocols (staff
aware of the manipulation, but this was likely to have had no influence on the analysis of the
results), bias due to missing data (data from all or nearly all participants were analyzed), and
outcome assessment (the assessors were not blinded to the type of outcomes, but this was likely
to have had no influence on the results).
Fig 1. Flow chart of the literature search.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0234321.g001
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Table 1. Results of literature search.
Study Subjects Imaging
method
Task Type of
agency
Contrast Coordinates (x,
y,z)
Coordinate
space
Agnew et al., 2008 [28] 20 fMRI finger tap negative passive VS active finger tap 48 -30 26 MNI
32 -36 62
-52 -22 50
-46 -28 24
positive active VS passive finger tapping 4 -50 -20
Balslev et al., 2008 [51] 15 fMRI cursor movement negative asynchronous VS synchronous stimulation 54 -42 33 MNI
-42 -51 45
-54 -48 27
51 -24 -12
David et al., 2007 [38] 14 fMRI joystick movement negative incongruent VS congruent feedback 40 44 22 MNI
-2 -64 48
-40 -48 42
2 12 62
-42 -2 56
52 -34 -10
40 50 12
60 -42 38
34 4 60
-40 -40 58
-44 -66 10
Decety et al., 2002 [52] 18 PET hand manipulation of 3D geometrical objects positive imitation of the self by the other VS self action 54 -52 40 MNI
14 30 40
0 44 38
46 20 30
14 12 10
52 22 8
-6 12 56
-12 -50 40
Farrer et al., 2002 [25] 12 fMRI joystick movement negative other attribution VS self-attribution 44 -58 32 MNI
-48 -52 40
-6 -58 50
2 -50 44
-38 28 48
positive self-attribution VS other attribution 40 8 2
-36 -2 2
Farrer et al., 2003 [32] 8 PET joystick movement negative 25˚ deviation VS 0˚, in conjunction with 50˚ VS 25˚ and other-
controlled VS 50˚
56 -56 36 MNI
-64 -58 32
0 14 54
50 10 58
12 30 42
Farrer et al., 2008 (Experiment
1) [33]
15 fMRI manual peg removal task: removing as many golf pegs as possible from a
grid within a time limit
negative delay VS no delay 44 -54 38 MNI
-40 -58 36
-48 -38 -54
-22 52 32
28 52 40
-30 24 -12
-10 26 64
-34 -20 66
-14 -42 6
Farrer et al., 2008 (Experiment
2) [33]
18 fMRI alternate index and middle finger movement negative perturbed visual feedback VS unperturbed visual feedback 58 -46 48 MNI
44 -50 60
-48 -46 56
-48 28 30
-44 22 36
28 54 -2
46 30 42
-54 18 20
38 50 -2
(Continued)
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Table 1. (Continued)
Study Subjects Imaging
method
Task Type of
agency
Contrast Coordinates (x,
y,z)
Coordinate
space
Fink et al., 1999 [42] 23 PET Luria’s bimanual coordination task: open and close the two hands negative out-of-phase VS in-phase hand movement 44 22 32 TAL
-50 18 48
50 -54 38
-52 -44 42
-30 -66 -42
Fukushima et al., 2013 [40] 17 fMRI key press negative no agency judgement VS agency judgement 48 -25 62 MNI
-8 0 31
-15 -32 -15
positive agency judgement VS no agency judgement 10 -42 20
38 -91 -8
-22 -84 -33
-5 -56 48
-33 -60 27
-36 21 41
38 18 13
Kontaris et al., 2009 [34] 11 fMRI hand actions, such as fist closing and finger extension negative incompatible VS compatible condition 57 -55 19 TAL
60 -46 -5
45 12 22
48 17 2
9 -55 34
42 5 34
0 38 43
-54 -52 16
-6 8 55
-45 11 31
-42 -46 -8
-42 20 2
positive compatible VS incompatible condition 24 -85 1
24 -76 16
Kühn et al., 2013 [35] 17 fMRI key press positive active VS passive condition -11 -8 74 MNI
Leube et al., 2003a [50] 6 fMRI open and close the hand negative displaying other’s hand VS own hand 12 -87 -6 MNI
9 39 24
9 -87 27
positive displaying own hand VS other’s hand 39 -75 -6
42 -60 -9
36 -72 24
-30 -81 21
45 9 24
27 -51 63
Leube et al., 2003b [20] 18 fMRI open and close the hand negative delay VS baseline 33 21 -6 MNI
54 12 9
48 6 36
51 -69 3
24 -93 15
-24 -96 9
-33 21 -6
-51 6 36
-3 18 48
-54 -24 27
-33 -36 63
-15 12 -6
(Continued)
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Table 1. (Continued)
Study Subjects Imaging
method
Task Type of
agency
Contrast Coordinates (x,
y,z)
Coordinate
space
Matsuzawa et al., 2005 [26] 6 fMRI key press negative delayed VS synchronous 10 -57 -6 TAL
36 -42 44
-2 -75 9
-40 -15 56
-10 -4 70
28 -1 61
57 12 3
positive synchronous VS delayed 26 -53 -19
38 -50 58
-38 -17 58
4 3 68
32 1 59
57 10 5
Miele et al., 2011 [21] 11 fMRI cursor movement negative conditions with turbulence VS conditions without turbulence 56 -34 26 MNI
68 -34 18
58 -34 14
48 -62 4
26 -16 68
14 -28 66
12 -8 68
-48 -34 18
-40 -48 24
-46 -66 8
-46 -56 10
-60 -64 6
-16 -38 70
-34 -42 70
-28 -58 64
Nahab et al., 2010 [36] 20 fMRI finger movement with virtual hand (cyber glove) negative coherent VS incoherent hand movement 56 -50 12 TAL
52 -46 18
20 8 56
62 -50 6
22 8 62
40 -46 14
58 -52 36
-50 -52 44
-38 -56 -40
32 2 54
-32 20 2
8 -56 42
-38 46 24
34 -58 36
-34 16 12
21 20 5
50 -56 24
40 26 42
38 10 32
52 -40 -4
8 8 54
46 -62 38
46 -56 50
-44 -50 38
44 8 54
-14 -70 -28
-46 40 18
Renes et al., 2015 [53] 23 fMRI key press to move a square on a screen positive agency over the square movement VS no agency -52 -68 32 MNI
-20 52 40
20 36 52
8 64 4
(Continued)
PLOS ONE Meta-analysis on the sense of agency during motor control
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0234321 June 5, 2020 7 / 17
Table 1. (Continued)
Study Subjects Imaging
method
Task Type of
agency
Contrast Coordinates (x,
y,z)
Coordinate
space
Schnell et al., 2007 [30] 15 fMRI bimanual joystick movement negative monitor of incongruence VS control condition 45 20 40 TAL
50 36 15
39 20 49
24 59 5
27 65 11
-3 20 40
-3 34 37
3 40 39
62 -51 22
53 -45 24
-59 -51 36
-50 -53 47
9 -71 39
62 -24 -14
65 -36 -11
-45 -58 8
0 -25 21
-15 -77 -31
positive control condition VS monitor of incongruence 62 4 25
-56 1 22
-3 61 -6
-36 -21 54
33 -29 54
-48 -18 42
33 -30 48
50 3 -5
-45 -6 -5
-65 -26 7
-15 -55 6
27 5 -8
30 -15 -2
-12 -60 -25
18 -54 -25
Spengler et al., 2009a [27] 17 fMRI finger movement negative increasing activation with increasing sensory-motor discrepancy 49 -52 18 TAL
-47 -55 12
Spengler et al., 2009b [41] 18 fMRI key press negative increasing activation with increasing sensory-motor discrepancy 49 -52 18 TAL
-47 -55 12
-35 17 24
Tsakiris et al., 2010 [37] 20 fMRI finger movement negative asynchronous VS synchronous stimulation 40 -58 26 MNI
52 -38 38
-38 20 2
-16 -84 -26
-12 -62 -38
40 52 14
24 48 -14
50 -46 -2
60 20 6
positive synchronous VS asynchronous stimulation -22 -54 -24
24 -40 54
38 -42 58
12 -48 -20
-44 -18 18
24 -72 36
Yomogida et al., 2010 [31] 24 fMRI joystick movement negative agency violation VS sensory match violation -22 -66 -12 MNI
-6 -4 52
6 8 60
30 -72 24
52 -58 12
42 -72 12
20 experiments (169 foci, 295 subjects) were identified for negative agency, and 11 experiments (58 foci, 165 subjects) for positive agency.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0234321.t001
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Summary of results of the meta-analysis
20 experiments explored neural correlates of negative agency (mean±SD of sample size = 15±5
subjects/experiment), of which six did not report complete demographic information of their
sample [20, 25, 27, 31, 34, 50]. 146 male and 149 female subjects, 292 right handed, with age
between 18 and 63, were tested. 11 experiments (sample size = 15±6 subjects/experiment)
explored neural correlates of positive agency, of which three did not report complete demo-
graphic information of their sample [25, 34, 50]. 93 male and 72 female subjects, 163 right
handed, with age between 18 and 50, were tested. Eight studies were conducted in Europe,
three in the United States, and two in Japan. Nine studies did not report place of data
collection.
Overall, we extracted 169 foci from 295 subjects for negative agency, and 58 foci from 165
subjects for positive agency.
The results of the meta-analysis evidenced three significant clusters of activation for nega-
tive agency, in the right superior temporal gyrus (Fig 3A), left inferior parietal lobule (Fig 3B),
and left middle temporal gyrus, respectively (Fig 3C). Positive agency showed no significant
clusters. Detailed results are shown in Table 2.
Discussion
We performed a quantitative meta-analysis of 22 studies investigating the SoA by means of
neuroimaging techniques, with the aim of precisely identify the location of the neural network
of negative and positive agency for motor control. Our results showed an involvement of the
bilateral temporo-parietal areas for processing of negative agency, whereas no clear areas
devoted to positive agency were found.
Negative agency
According to the comparator model of agency [9, 10], the brain area responsible for the com-
parison between the expected and actual motor outcome lays in the PPC, at the junction with
the temporal lobe, a region often identified as temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) [1]. This area
represents a crucial step in the comparator model, and it has been hypothesized that the activa-
tion of the TPJ is the neural signature of the lack of agency [1]. This is due to the fact that,
Fig 2. Distribution of experiments investigating the sense of agency over the last 20 years.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0234321.g002
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when the action does not match its prediction, a compensatory movement for the unexpected
outcome is often needed, and the trigger for this may come from the TPJ.
Interestingly, the coordinates of the mean peak of activity of the area identified as TPJ has
not been consistent in the literature, with studies reporting activation in the angular gyrus [25,
27, 30–34, 36–38, 41, 42, 51], as well as in the middle temporal gyrus [21, 27, 30, 38, 41], the
parietal operculum [21, 28, 39] and the supramarginal gyrus [37, 51], and our results evidenced
Fig 3. Results of the meta-analysis. Main brain areas showing hyper-activation patterns in response to negative
agency. (A) cluster with peak on the right superior temporal gyrus. (B) cluster with peak on the left inferior parietal
lobule. (C) cluster with peak on the left middle temporal gyrus. All clusters are FWE-corrected with p-value< 0.05.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0234321.g003
Table 2. Results of the meta-analysis.
Type of
agency
Brain region Cluster size
(mm3)
Peak MNI
Coordinates
(x,y,z)
Peak ALE
value
negative Right superior temporal gyrus (63.3%) Right middle temporal gyrus (34.1%) Right angular gyrus
(2.3%)
3320 50 -54 14 0.021�
Left inferior parietal lobule (100%) 1888 -44 -52 42 0.020�
Left middle temporal gyrus (58.3%) Left superior temporal gyrus (25%) Left middle occipital
gyrus (16.7%)
1640 -48 -56 8 0.025�
All ALE values are significant at a FWE-corrected p-value < 0.05.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0234321.t002
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several clusters of activation in the temporo-parietal areas (Fig 3). Indeed, the concept of
agency arises from a combination of several multidimensional processes, including mismatch
detection [34, 51], action awareness [33], or sensory-motor conflicts [37]. In particular, the
role of the angular gyrus has been attributed to inter-sensory mismatch detection [27, 30, 32–
34, 38, 41, 51], action awareness [33, 36, 37, 41], and integration of multisensory information
[33, 37, 38, 41], often related to body ownership and SoA, whereas specific sensory-motor con-
flicts are processed in the supramarginal gyrus [37]. Further on the subdivision of specific
aspects of the SoA, one study reported differential activation in the posterior superior temporal
sulcus (pSTS), and in the middle temporal gyrus, in response to differences in the processing
of perspective changes [27]. A task involving a change in perspective, mentalizing and decep-
tion (e.g., a task that requires a distinction of perspectives by assigning actions to either oneself
or someone else) activates the TPJ, whereas tasks with no changes in perspectives (e.g., tasks
with simple disruption of motor control) activate the pSTS. This suggests that changes in per-
spective contribute to the SoA, and help assigning motor representations to oneself or to an
external agent. Taken together, these findings show that different neural mechanisms, with
specific neural correlates, contribute to agency formation when motor control is disrupted,
and that a brain area common to all of them can be found in the TPJ.
Similar considerations can be done for the lateralization of the TPJ. Several studies have
found bilateral activation [21, 25, 27, 28, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 42, 51, 52], as confirmed by our
results. However, some studies have found predominant activity in the right hemisphere [26,
30–32, 37, 41], or in the left one [3]. A clear distinction between functions of the TPJ in the
two hemispheres has not been described, but it has been hypothesized that the left, rather than
the right, parietal cortex plays a role in visuo-motor integration for goal directed actions [52].
However, our results evidenced a potential confound in the handedness of participants, as
most of the tested subjects were right-handed, and this could generate asymmetries in the
activity of the TPJ, which in turn might elicit differential neural responses across hemispheres
[28]. Although it was not the focus of this meta-analysis, studies in neuropsychiatric patients
have shown that lesions of the right parietal cortex are associated with patients’ feelings that
their limbs do not belong to themselves [54, 55], and studies with schizophrenic patients have
found an association between hyperactivity in the right parietal cortex and the feeling that
their own actions are controlled by someone else [4, 56, 57]. This then suggests that agency
attributions are mainly processed in the right TPJ.
Positive agency
No significant clusters of activation were found for positive agency. Overall, the network of
positive agency is not well-understood yet, and a pattern across the literature is difficult to
find. One explanation that may account for this lack of consistency is that full control and pos-
itive agency are the default, with different regions and networks only becoming responsive
during the loss of control [36, 58]. In line with the comparator model, when no sensory dis-
crepancy is detected, the movement is considered self-generated, and its sensory effect is
canceled.
Interestingly, it has been hypothesized that this differential brain activation can be used to
distinguish between self- and externally generated movements, as only the latter elicit a neural
response in relation to agency [58, 59]. This theory has found confirmation in behavioral stud-
ies, where participants rated self-administered tactile stimuli as less tickly than the same sti-
muli generated externally [60], as well as in fMRI studies, where neural activity was found
lower when tactile stimulation was self-produced compared to when it was externally pro-
duced [61], and studies with magnetoencephalography, where responsiveness of the auditory
PLOS ONE Meta-analysis on the sense of agency during motor control
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cortex was reduced when participants spoke themselves compared to when they heard a sound
played back [62].
Other brain areas involved in the SoA
Several areas commonly associated with the SoA, such as the SMA or the insula, were not
revealed by our analysis. The SMA has been found responsible for processing agency error
during action execution [63, 64], and for providing predictions of the sensory consequences of
an action to other brain regions, thus enabling agency formation [31, 65]. Similarly, the insula
has been associated with multimodal integration of different signals related to the executed
action [25, 32, 38], including emotional and visceral signals [66], and subjective timing [67,
68]. We did not find activity in these areas, and this may be due to the fact that these areas
respond only to specific cognitive processes which marginally contribute to agency formation,
and are not key arears for the SoA in relation to motor action. Our analysis revealed neural
substrates shared across all these processes, within the TPJ.
As for explicit judgement of agency, little research has been dedicated to its neural corre-
lates [21, 41]. Explicit assignments of agency have been correlated, for instance, with activity in
dorsal fronto-median cortex [41], indicative of an interpretative, higher-level mechanism,
incorporating contextual knowledge and belief reasoning. Other neural correlates of the judge-
ment of agency have been found in the anterior prefrontal cortex and the orbito-frontal cortex
[21], regions associated with self-reflective processing, receiving input from subcortical struc-
tures related to appraisal of self-relevant sensory stimuli [69], and from areas of the lateral pre-
frontal cortex relevant for conscious judgements about the self [21].
Overall, the SoA seems to arise from a combination of bottom-up and top-down processes
with separate neural substrates, the pre-reflective feeling of agency, relying on the comparator
model, which shapes a high-order reflective judgment of agency [17, 41]. Preconscious pro-
cessing is associated with activity in the TPJ, which may spread to the frontal areas when it
reaches consciousness [38].
Strengths and limitations of the current study
The main strength of our study is the use of whole-brain analysis to take into account all brain
areas responsible for the SoA during motor execution. To the best of our knowledge, this is a
novel approach, as previous meta-analyses focused on specific areas (regions of interests) only
[21, 43], or on the SoA from a general point of view [1], and not in relation to motion, as it
should be studied [44]. We thus excluded studies with, for instance, auditory [39], or pure
visual [3] stimulation. Moreover, the last meta-analysis was conducted about ten years ago [1],
and we could therefore include the results of the most recent studies in the field.
One potential limitation is in our definition of agency, which involved a general mismatch
between motor output and visual feedback. We did not control for specific components of
agency, targeted by single studies, which could have evidenced different areas, such as the
SMA and the insula. However, our results evidenced that, despite specific subparts of agency,
the TPJ is the area consistently active during decreased agency, strengthening the model of
mismatch detection and its neural correlates. In line with this, another limitation is the focus
on the feeling of agency only, which left aside the brain network of explicit judgement of
agency. We decided not to include in the meta-analysis studies focusing on the judgement of
agency, as our search identified only two experiments [21, 41] investigating this topic. Future
neuroimaging studies should thus focus more on this aspect. Another limitation is the time
window we selected, i.e., 20 years, that allowed us to include in the analysis only the most
recent studies. We decided to search the literature only after 1999 because the definition of the
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SoA, as well as the quality of the neuroimaging techniques, may have been different earlier,
and could not guarantee the inclusion of studies with comparable results. Last, our search cri-
teria mainly relied on the keyword “agency”. We used the “related search” option to include as
many studies as possible on this topic, but we cannot exclude that some studies, which defined
“agency” with another keyword, were not detected by our search strategy.
Conclusions
We performed a quantitative, whole-brain, meta-analysis of 22 neuroimaging studies on the
SoA for motor control, which confirmed a clear network subtending negative agency, whose
main nodes are in the bilateral TPJ (MNI: 50, -54, 14; -44, -52, 42; -48, -56, 8). Even if bilateral
activation was found, the right TPJ confirmed its crucial role in detection of sensory-motor
discrepancy [33]. No clear network was found for positive agency.
These results set the background for future regions-of-interest (ROIs) studies on the inves-
tigation of neural correlates of the SoA during motor control, as they provide the precise loca-
tion of brain areas involved in the network of agency, as well as a neural subdivision of various
aspects of agency processing related to motion execution. Our results will also serve as a back-
ground for studies aiming to use non-invasive brain stimulation techniques to modulate the
SoA in healthy subjects and patients with disorders involving perturbed sense of agency (e.g.,
schizophrenia [4], alien hand syndrome [6], or functional neurological disorders [7]).
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62. Curio G, Neuloh G, Numminen J, Jousmäki V, Hari R. Speaking modifies voice-evoked activity in the
human auditory cortex. Human brain mapping. 2000; 9(4):183–91. https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1097-
0193(200004)9:4<183::aid-hbm1>3.0.co;2-z PMID: 10770228
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